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I. INTRODUCTION

In July 2014, the United States Government submitted a proposal to
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) 1 suggesting the creation of a new international treaty
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solicitor in England and Wales, is the Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law at the University of
Missouri and Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution. The author would
like to thank Perry Bechky and Tim Schnabel for comments and insights on earlier drafts of this
Article. Although the author has been involved in discussions at both the national and international
levels regarding a possible new international convention on international commercial mediation and
conciliation, the opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author alone and do not reflect
the views of any governmental or non-governmental body.
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concerning the enforcement of settlement agreements arising out of
international commercial mediation and conciliation. 2 The Commission
sent the proposal to UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration and
Conciliation) for further consideration, and the initiative moved
forward. 3 At the time this Article was published, the instrument was in
the drafting stages, although the final form of the document (convention,
model law, or advisory statement) was still under discussion. 4
As important as the U.S. proposal has been to the substantive
debate about the need for and shape of a future instrument in this field, 5
1. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Proposal by the
Government of the United States of America: Future Work for Working Group II, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/822 (June 2, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal]. The State Department’s interest in this
subject arose as a result of this author’s academic work in this field. See S.I. Strong, Beyond
International Commercial Arbitration? The Promise of International Commercial Mediation, 45
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 11, 29-38 (2014) [hereinafter Strong, ICM]; see also infra note 62.
2. Although the scholarly community debates the precise meaning of the terms “mediation”
and “conciliation,” this Article will consider the two to be synonymous for the purpose of this
discussion, an approach that is consistent with that taken by UNCITRAL. See United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and
Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-second session (New York, 2-6 February 2015), para. 13 n.11,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832 (Feb. 11, 2015) [hereinafter WG Report]; UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and Use 2002 [hereinafter
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW GUIDE].
3. See Annotated Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.139, paras. 12-19
(Nov. 4, 2015) [hereinafter February 2016 Agenda]; see also United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, Annotated Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.185 (Nov.
4, 2014); Note by UNCITRAL Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability of
Settlement Agreements Resulting From International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.187 (Nov. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Secretariat Note]; Comments Received
From States, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability of Settlement Agreements
Resulting From International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation—Revision of UNCITRAL Notes
on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WP.II/WP.188 (Dec. 23, 2014) [hereinafter
Initial States’ Comments].
3. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on its fortyseventh Session (7-18 July 2014), U.N. G.A.O.R. 69th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 24, U.N. Doc.
A/69/17.
4. At the time of publication, the most recent in-depth discussion of the U.S. proposal took
place at the February 2017 meeting of Working Group II. See United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixtysixth session (New York, 6-10 February 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901 (Feb. 16, 2017). The
session was extremely productive and delegates came to agreement on a number of important
points. See id. The project was also favorably discussed at the forty-ninth session of the
Commission in June and July 2016. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
Annotated Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.197 (July 14, 2016); United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Note by UNCITRAL Secretariat, International
Commercial Conciliation: Preparation of an Instrument on Enforcement of International
Commercial
Settlement
Agreements
Resulting
From
Conciliation,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.198 (June 30, 2016) [hereinafter Secretariat 2016 Note].
5. See Laurence Boule, International Enforceability for Mediated Settlement Agreements:
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the UNCITRAL deliberations have also uncovered a number of processoriented issues that raise doubts about certain long-held assumptions
regarding the nature of the international legal community and the
contemporary approach to the negotiation of international treaties. As a
result, the current discussions about the proposed treaty provide a unique
opportunity to consider how various theories regarding international
relations actually affect the international lawmaking process.
This Article seeks to illuminate a number of truths about the current
deliberations at UNCITRAL by applying the concept of epistemic
communities to the UNCITRAL negotiation process. This analysis will
help various participants, including state delegates, inter-governmental
organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
appreciate the dynamics at issue in the treaty deliberations and thereby
improve negotiation techniques and outcomes. 6 In particular, this Article
considers how disparities between different epistemic communities
involved in the UNCITRAL process could affect the shape and future of
the proposed convention and whether the clash of cultures could prove
Developing the Conceptual Framework, 7 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 35, 65 (2014) (proposing a
convention); CPR Institute, Research Preview Provides Rare Mediation User Data in the
International Arena, 33 ALT. HIGH COST LITIG. 92 (2015) (discussing empirical data supporting a
new convention in this field); Ellen A. Deason, Enforcement of Settlement Agreements in
International Commercial Mediation: A New Legal Framework?, 22 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 32 (2015)
(discussing the current U.S. initiative); Laura A. Kaster, Will There Be A Vast Worldwide Expansion
of Mediation for International Disputes?, 33 ALT. HIGH COST LITIG. 120 (2015) (describing the
current debate at UNCITRAL); Yaraslau Kryvoi & Dmitry Davyenko, Consent Awards in
International Arbitration: From Settlement to Enforcement, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 827 (2015)
(discussing the UNCITRAL deliberations); Audrey Hong Li, Thought on Developing Convention on
Enforceability of Settlement Agreements Reached Through Conciliation, ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL
ARBITRATION GROUP (APRAG) NEWSLETTER, 19, 20 (July-Dec. 2014) (supporting a new
convention); Chang-Fa Lo, Desirability of a New International Legal Framework for Cross-Border
Enforcement of Certain Mediated Settlement Agreements, 7 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. 119, 135 (2014)
(suggesting a new enforcement regime); Ray D. Madoff, Lurking in the Shadow: The Unseen Hand
of Doctrine in Dispute Resolution, 76 SO. CAL. L. REV. 161, 161-66 (2002) (noting the need for a
new treaty); Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11 (proposing a new convention); Bobette Wolski,
Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs): Critical Questions and Directions for Future
Research, 7 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 87, 110 (2014) (supporting a new treaty).
6. This type of analysis has been undertaken in the past, initially with respect to
international environmental law. See, e.g., Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World
Affairs, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE 1,
10 (Oran R. Young ed., 1997); Jutta Brunee & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and
Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 26, 31 (1997). However, the
concept of epistemic communities has also been successfully used in the context of international
trade law and international arbitration. See Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Regulation? On the
Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 875, 888 (2011)
(distinguishing between epistemic communities in “private commercial law and arbitration” and
public international law); Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and
International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 71 (2014).
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fatal to the development of a new international instrument in this area of
law.
Although the current discussion is set within a particular context,
the research findings are widely transferable to other settings and apply
to international lawmaking on subjects other than dispute resolution and
in settings other than UNCITRAL. This type of intellectual crossfertilization is extremely helpful and moves in both directions. For
example, the process of “transgovernmental coalition building” has been
successfully studied in a variety of settings but has not yet been
discussed in the context of international dispute resolution. 7 Thus, this
strand of international relations theory seems ripe for transference to the
world of international dispute resolution. 8
As a methodological matter, the current analysis adopts a
negotiation-analytic perspective rather than a game-theoretic approach. 9
To some extent, this choice may appear unusual, given the extensive use
of game theory in international law and international relations. 10
However, a number of commentators have argued that negotiation
theory is more accurate than game theory in describing and anticipating
the forces at work in the international lawmaking process.11 This
conclusion is based on the fact that negotiation theorists “typically
assume intelligent, goal-seeking action by the other players but not full
strategic rationality,” as is the case with game theorists.12 Thus,
7. Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A
Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L. 491, 502 (2012) (quoting Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye,
Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 44 (1974)).
8. This type of analysis has seldom been conducted. See Andrea Bianchi, Epistemic
Communities, in FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW *1, 1 (Jean d’Aspremont &
Sahib Singh eds., forthcoming 2017) (noting that law accounts for only six percent of the references
to the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ by discipline in a citation analysis reflected in Peter
Haas, Epistemic Communities, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS 351, 357
(Joel Krieger ed., 2013)). Notably, this methodology differs from standard cross-cultural analyses,
which focus on national differences. See, e.g., Erin Meyer, Getting to Si, Ja, Oui, Hai and Da,
HARV. BUS. REV. 74, 74-80 (2015).
9. See James K. Sebenius, Challenging Conventional Explanations of International
Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities, 46 INT’L ORG. 323,
351 (1992).
10. See id.
11. See Antonia Chayes, International Agreements: Why They Count as Law, 103 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L PROC. 158, 160 (2009) (noting negotiation theory adds another level of complexity to game
theory in the context of international treaty negotiation); Sebenius, supra note 9, at 325, 351; see
also Christian Downie, Managing Complexity in International Negotiations: Is There A Role for
Treaty
Secretariats?,
2-6,
http://www.guillaumenicaise.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/
DOWNIE_Managing-Complexity-in-International-Negotiations.pdf
[hereinafter
Downie,
Complexity] (discussing the relationship between game theory and negotiation theory).
12. Sebenius, supra note 9, at 350. Game theory “assume[s] that players are fully rational and
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negotiation theory incorporates various elements of game theory but
takes the analysis to a higher level of complexity. 13
The Article proceeds as follows. First, Section II introduces the
concept of epistemic communities as developed by international
relations theorists and considers those principles in light of the current
UNCITRAL process. Next, Section III analyzes the role of epistemic
communities in the international lawmaking process and discusses how
those groups operate pursuant to standard principles of negotiation
theory. Section IV then applies both sets of the theories to the ongoing
deliberations at UNCITRAL to identify the interests and goals of the
different epistemic communities and determine whether and to what
extent various areas of divergence and convergence will affect the
UNCITRAL deliberation process. Section V concludes the Article by
tying together various strands of analysis and identifying several
tangible proposals for negotiators at UNCITRAL.
This discussion is set in the context of the current debate about a
new treaty on mediated settlement agreements and is therefore most
relevant to those involved in that process. However, the Article has
much broader ramifications. Not only does the analysis provide
important new insights into the theoretical nature of the international
legal community, it also offers new ideas about how certain practical
problems involving international dispute resolution can and perhaps
should be resolved. 14 As a result, the research findings reflected herein
are relevant to anyone working in the area of international lawmaking.
II. EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY
International relations theory defines an epistemic community as a
“network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in
a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue-area.” 15 These groups reflect

analyze their actions by equilibrium methods that calculate what each should optimally do given the
others’ optimal choice.” Id.
13. See Chayes, supra note 11, at 160; Downie, Complexity, supra note 11, at 2-6.
14. Many of the criticisms have focused on the increasing cost and legalism of international
commercial arbitration. See David Rivkin, A New Contract Between Arbitrators and Parties (Oct.
27,
2015),
http://sccinstitute.com/media/93206/1000973790v2-hkiac-keynote-address.pdf
(constituting a speech from the president of the International Bar Association proposing a new
means to reduce costs in international arbitration); Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11.
15. Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L
ORG. 1, 2-3 (1992) (citations omitted).
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(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a
value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2)
shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices
leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and
which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions
of validity—that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for
weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise;
and (4) a common policy enterprise—that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare
will be enhanced as a consequence. 16

At one time, theorists used this definition to conclude that
international lawyers, judges, and commentators comprised a single
epistemic community. 17 However, the expansion and diversification of
international law has led to various schisms within the group. As a
result, experts in international trade law are now considered to be
separate from experts in international investment law, while specialists
in international dispute resolution are seen as distinguishable from
specialists in public international law.18
The question now arises as to whether the field of international
dispute resolution can or should be defined as consisting of two separate
and distinct groups, one involving specialists in international arbitration
and the other involving experts in mediation. This proposition is based
on the ongoing deliberations at UNCITRAL concerning the proposed
treaty on mediated settlements, which has seen some participants

16. Id. (citation omitted). Epistemic communities may also have
share[d] intersubjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared
patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared values, shared causal
beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices; and have a shared commitment to the
application and production of knowledge.
Id. at 3 n.5.
17. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW GLOBAL ORDER 65-100 (2004); Charlotte Ku,
The ASIL as an Epistemic Community, 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 224, 584 (1996); Andy Olson,
An Empire of Scholars: Transnational Lawyers and the Rule of Opinio Juris, 29 PERSPECTIVES
POL. SCI. 23 (2000) (suggesting that specialists in international law constitute a closed epistemic
community); Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented But
Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 959, 966 (2009) (stating “that
international lawyers and judges constitute an epistemic community” and that “[s]uch an epistemic
community or network is capable of overcoming or mitigating many axes or dimensions of
fragmentation”).
18. See Schill, supra note 6, at 888; Robert D. Sloane, Law at the Vanishing Point: A
Philosophical Analysis of International Law, by Aaron Fichtelberg, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 549, 554
(2010) (book review); Wagner, supra note 6, at 71.
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focusing on different issues, concerns, and strategies, depending on
whether and to what extent those persons come from an arbitration or
mediation background. 19 If such a division does exist, it could affect the
negotiation strategies and outcomes at UNCITRAL. 20
The process of identifying an epistemic community can be
somewhat difficult, since there is no need for members of a particular
community to hold a certain set of credentials or be recognized by an
official regulatory body. 21 Instead, epistemic communities are made up
of individuals “who have a sufficiently strong claim to a body of
knowledge that is valued by society.” 22 Groups can develop around
shared technical expertise in the hard or social sciences and around
common beliefs about various processes or analytic methods used in the
members’ professions or disciplines. 23
Some epistemic communities are limited to the national sphere,
although groups can take on a transnational tenor as shared ideas spread
19. The author has been part of discussions at both the national and international levels
regarding the proposed convention since the idea was first presented to the U.S. State Department in
February 2014. Since some of those discussions took place on an unattributed basis (i.e., pursuant to
the Chatham House Rule), this Article will not identify specific positions taken by any individuals
or groups beyond what is noted in documents that have been made publicly available by
UNCITRAL and UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation).
20. See infra notes 106-87 and accompanying text.
21. At this point, neither mediation nor arbitration are officially regulated, although there are
various initiatives associated with self-regulation and credentialing. See, e.g., Robert A. Creo,
Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1017, 1021 (2004) (calling for
credentialing in mediation); Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 968 (2005) (noting “prior service as an arbitrator is the preeminent
qualification for an arbitrator-candidate”); Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living With
ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in
Fortune 1000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 11 n.58 (2014) (noting attempts to
credential arbitrators); How to Become IMI Certified, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION INSTITUTE,
https://imimediation.org/how-to-become-imi-certified (establishing a credentialing program);
Training and Development, CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS (CIArb),
http://www.ciarb.org/training-and-development (establishing a “ladder of education” in domestic
and international arbitration).
22. Haas, supra note 15, at 16.
23. See id. There is some debate as to whether the concept of epistemic communities can be
extended to include lawyers, although most recent research suggests that the term can indeed be
extended to members of the legal profession. See Bianchi, supra note 8, at 6 (comparing Peter Haas,
Ideas, Experts and Governance, in THE ROLE OF EXPERTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES: ADVISORS, DECISION MAKERS OR IRRELEVANT ACTORS? 26
(Monika Ambrus et al. eds., 2014) (suggesting lawyers cannot constitute an epistemic community)
and Olson, supra note 17, at 23 (“In many respects, the community of international lawyers
provides a model example of Haas’s definition of an epistemic community of elites. This
community views itself as a guild of accredited specialists engaged in the formation of society’s
rules and uniquely qualified to interpret international law.”)); Ku, supra note 17, at 584 (concluding
groups of lawyers can constitute an epistemic community).
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through the community via professional conferences, journals, and other
formal and informal collaborations. 24 Transnational epistemic
communities tend to advance their policy positions more effectively than
national groups because transnational communities have larger
networks. 25
At this point, “it is indisputable that the international arbitration
world is an identifiable epistemic community that transcends national
borders.” 26 Indeed, numerous observers, beginning with Yves Dezalay
and Bryant Garth in the mid-1980s, have characterized the international
arbitral community as an “insider’s club” made up of knowledgeable
specialists. 27 Although some scholars believe that the community of
arbitration experts developed as a result of economic rather than cultural
factors, 28 other commentators focus on the growth of various social
networks as critical to the creation of an international body of likeminded specialists. 29 Certainly, it is true that a globally cohesive set of
beliefs and practices has been facilitated and encouraged by the large
number of specialty journals and conferences dedicated to international
arbitration 30 as well as the now-prevalent view of arbitration as the
preferred, if not primary means, of resolving international commercial
and investment disputes. 31 As a result, international arbitration clearly
24. See Haas, supra note 15, at 17; see also SLAUGHTER, supra note 17, at 65-100
(describing the importance of networks in the international legal system). Some commentators have
noted that transnational dispute resolution, which would include international commercial
arbitration and international commercial mediation or conciliation, “foster[s] epistemic communities
that bridge international and domestic legal cultures” and “are especially effective in norm
transmission in comparison to State-to-State dispute settlement.” Christopher J. Borgen,
Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms: The Hegemony of Process, 39 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 685, 727 (2007).
25. See Haas, supra note 15, at 17.
26. Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 69, 69 (2003). One question that may become important in the future is whether there
are two arbitral communities, one made up of specialists in international commercial arbitration and
one made up of specialists in international investment arbitration. See Anthea Roberts, Divergence
Between Investment and Commercial Arbitration, 106 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 297, 297-99 (Mar.
28-31, 2012). However, this point is not relevant to the current discussion.
27. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE (1996).
28. See Tom Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1335, 1345
(2003).
29. See Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 38990 (2014).
30. See S.I. STRONG, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: SOURCES AND STRATEGIES 71-137 (2009) (noting sources); Rogers, supra note 21,
at 1016.
31. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 73 (2014). The
popularity of international arbitration is undeniable: according to recent estimates, up to ninety
percent of all international commercial contracts include an arbitration provision with a similarly
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reflects a common “set of causal approaches or orientations and . . .
consensual knowledge base” and “shared normative commitments” that
arise not as a result of a professional code of conduct but from a
“principled approach to the issue at hand.” 32 Thus, the field of
international arbitration can be said to meet the definition of an
epistemic community. 33
At this point, it is unclear whether and to what extent the same can
be said of mediation. On the one hand, the field does appear to be
populated by an expert group of “true believers,” at least in the United
States, where specialists write glowingly of the advantages of mediation
over other dispute resolution mechanisms, including arbitration. 34 On the
other hand, significant questions exist as to the breadth of the mediation
community in terms of both geography and subject matter. For example,
empirical research suggests that mediation runs a distant second to
arbitration as the preferred means of resolving international business
matters 35 despite a number of efforts to expand the use of mediation in
regions outside of the United States 36 and in international commercial
high rate (ninety-three percent) of adherence to some form of arbitration in the 3,000-5,000
interstate investment treaties, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), now in effect.
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A LARGE SAMPLE SURVEY 5, 9
(2012), http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291678.pdf; Otto
Sandrock, The Choice Between Forum Selection, Mediation and Arbitration Clauses: European
Perspectives, 20 AM. REV. INT’L L. 7, 37 (2009); S.I. Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of
“Regulatory Arbitration” – Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and the International Investment
Regime, 38 J. CORP. L. 259, 300 n.271 (2013).
32. Haas, supra note 15, at 19; see also id. at 2-3 (listing four core attributes of an epistemic
community). This feature is particularly relevant to arbitration and mediation because those fields
have developed largely autonomously. Neither mediation nor arbitration can be said to exist
“outside” the law, since the state always retains an interest in overseeing various procedural matters,
but the amount of autonomy given to parties in mediation and arbitration is often significant. See
S.I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. §1782: Distinguishing International Commercial
Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 323-50
(2013).
33. See Alford, supra note 26, at 69; Haas, supra note 15, at 19.
34. See Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J.
DISP. RESOL. 81, 83 (noting near-universal belief among mediation experts that mediation is the
best means of resolving disputes).
35. See S.I. Strong, Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International
Commercial Mediation, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1973 (2016) [hereinafter Strong, Empirical].
36. This effort has met with mixed results. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Is Europe
Headed Down the Primrose Path with Mandatory Mediation?, 37 N.C. J. INT’L & COM. REG. 981,
982-85 (2012) [hereinafter Nolan-Haley, Primrose Path] (discussing reception of mediation in
Europe pursuant to various measures, including Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 2008 O.J. (L 136) 3); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The Best and Worst of
Times, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 731, 736 (2015).
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and investment disputes. 37
One way to resolve this tension might be to conclude that an
epistemic community exists, but only with respect to domestic mediation
in the United States. 38 However, a number of recent initiatives on the
international front suggest that an international community of mediation
experts may be in existence, even if that group is not as large or as
powerful as the international arbitral community. For example, the
creation of the International Mediation Institute (IMI) and the
development of a Global Pound Conference that puts mediation and
conciliation on equal footing with arbitration and litigation suggest that
experts in international commercial mediation are growing in
international sophistication and influence. 39 Similar conclusions can be
drawn from the increasing number of journals interested in scholarship
concerning international commercial mediation and conciliation, 40 as
well as the creation of several international student moots in this area of
law. 41 These types of communal activities are critical to the creation and
37. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 14-15. Some studies have suggested that people
involved in civil lawsuits prefer mediation to nonbinding arbitration at the early stages of the
dispute. See Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of Procedural Preference: How Litigants Evaluate
Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV. 637, 648-49 (2014).
38. Although the mediation community within the United States does not appear to have
described itself as an epistemic community, at least in so many words, the extensive amount of
literature on mediation and the increasing sophistication of the process suggests that the necessary
expertise and consensus as to the core values of commercial mediation exists. See Strong,
Empirical, supra note 35 (citing literature on mediation and particularly on commercial mediation).
A slightly different type of epistemic community is said to exist with respect to inter-state
mediation, which arises as a matter of public international law rather than private international law.
See RAYMOND COHEN, CULTURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, in RESOLVING
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION, 107, 111 (Jacob
Berkovitch ed., 1996); see also Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing interstate mediation).
39. See IMI, https://imimediation.org/ (last visited February 21, 2017).; Global Pound
Conference Series 2016-2017, http://globalpoundconference.org/. The Global Pound Conference is
being organized by IMI, which may not only help “promote interaction and shared beliefs” within
the international dispute resolution community but may also place members of IMI “advantageously
with respect to the decision-making and negotiating process.” Sebenius, supra note 9, at 362.
40. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARBITRATION, MEDIATION AND DISPUTE
MANAGEMENT; JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT; NON-JUDICIAL DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, STUDIES IN TRANSACTIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW (Norbert Horn & Joseph J. Norton eds., 2000); STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION 213-27 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 2002).
41. International commercial mediation moots are organized by both the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Bar Association in conjunction with the Vienna
International Arbitral Centre. The development of the international commercial arbitration
community has been greatly assisted by the popularity of international mooting competitions for law
students. See Mark L. Shulman, Making Progress: How Eric Bergsten and the Vis Moot Advance
the Enterprise of Universal Peace, 24 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (“The Vis Moot is justly
renowned for assembling more law students and lawyers in one place at one time than any other
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maintenance of an epistemic community, since that is how members of
such groups develop and promote their common agendas. 42
Empirical, comparative, and historical analyses also support the
notion that an epistemic community involving international commercial
mediation exists. For example, empirical research suggests that most
experts in international commercial mediation reside in England rather
than in the United States, 43 while a comparative study conducted by the
UNCITRAL Secretariat demonstrates the extent to which mediation
exists around the world. 44 Furthermore, the rise of international
commercial mediation cannot be considered a recent development, since
mediation and conciliation were the primary means of resolving
international commercial disputes prior to World War II. 45 As a result, it
may be that the field of international commercial mediation constitutes a
nascent epistemic community whose membership is small, particularly
in comparison to the international commercial arbitration community,
but highly motivated. 46
While the rise of a new epistemic group focusing on international
commercial mediation could initially be seen as benefitting efforts to
create a new UNCITRAL instrument on mediated settlement
agreements, the situation is actually much more complicated, since
“[t]he solidarity of epistemic community members derives not only from
their shared interests . . . but also their shared aversions.” 47 This feature
such competition.”).
42. See Haas, supra note 15, at 19.
43. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35.
44. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Settlement of Commercial
Disputes: Enforceability of Settlement Agreements Resulting From International Commercial
Mediation/Conciliation – Compilation of Comments by Governments, prepared for the 62nd through
64th Sessions of Working Group II, (2000-2017) [hereinafter Working Group II Comparative
Study]. Similar material has been collected by the World Bank. See WORLD BANK, INVESTING
ACROSS BORDERS (2012). Mediation and conciliation have long been favored in various Asian
cultures. See Shahla F. Ali, Approaching the Global Arbitration Table: Comparing the Advantages
of Arbitration as Seen by Practitioners in East Asia and the West, 28 REV. LITIG. 791, 796-97
(2009).
45. See Eric A. Schwartz, International Conciliation and the ICC, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN
INVEST. L.J. 98, 99, 107 (1995). The rise of international commercial arbitration in the post-War
period can be largely attributed to the success of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards (New York Convention). See United Nations
Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N. Doc
E/CONF.26/8/Rev.1 [hereinafter New York Convention]; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 13.
46. Thus, in a recent empirical study of the use and perception of international commercial
mediation, only nine percent of the respondents indicated that they had been involved in more than
twenty international commercial mediations in the last three years. See Strong, Empirical, supra
note 35, at 26.
47. Haas, supra note 15, at 20.
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is critically important to the future of the proposed treaty at UNCITRAL
because of the way in which the arbitration and mediation communities
view each other. For example, supporters of international commercial
arbitration often denigrate mediation as a “soft” procedural mechanism
that has few benefits and numerous disadvantages. 48 Conversely,
proponents of mediation criticize arbitration as being incapable of
providing certain key benefits (such as the preservation of ongoing
relationships and the development of integrative solutions). 49 The
apparent absence of common ground and a certain amount of reciprocal
ill-will between the two groups not only precludes the possibility of
having numerous individuals with influence and standing in both
communities, but also could drive the arbitration community to attempt
to block efforts at UNCITRAL to adopt a new treaty on international
commercial mediation.
III. EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES AND THE UNCITRAL PROCESS
A.

Epistemic Communities in International Lawmaking Processes

Recognizing the different factions within the international dispute
resolution community can be very useful to state delegations at
UNCITRAL, since it can help them develop strategies to manage such
conflicts. Before doing so, however, negotiators must appreciate how
epistemic communities operate in the international lawmaking process.
Epistemic communities gain political power as a result of their
“professional training, prestige, and reputation for expertise in an area
highly valued by society or elite decision makers.” 50 The need for expert
assistance is particularly marked in highly technical areas that require
international coordination. 51 In those situations, policymakers look to
48. For example, those who do not use mediation often believe it is contrary to the dispute
resolution culture in their home countries. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35. Furthermore, no
studies have yet shown that mediation actually saves parties time and money, which creates some
skepticism in the arbitral community about whether mediation is worthwhile. See id.
49. See Thomas Gaultier, Cross-Border Mediation: A New Solution for International
Commercial Settlement?, 26 INT’L PRACTICUM 38, 50-51 (2013). The notion of “integrative
solutions” (also known as win-win scenarios or “value claiming”) is most closely associated with
Roger Fisher and William Uhry, authors of the 1981 text, Getting to Yes, although the concept
actually dates back to the early 1900s. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed., 1992); Charles B. Craver, The Inherent Tension Between
Value Creation and Value Claiming During Bargaining Interactions, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 1, 9 (2010).
50. Haas, supra note 15, at 17 (noting these elements are supplemented by various “tests of
validity”).
51. See id. at 1; see also Emmanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic
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epistemic communities to help state actors fulfill their roles as
“uncertainty reducers” and “power and wealth pursuers.” 52
These attributes are self-evident in matters involving UNCITRAL.
For example, UNCITRAL’s core purpose is to decrease cross-border
commercial uncertainty and increase global wealth and prosperity. 53
UNCITRAL achieves these ends by relying heavily on technical
expertise generated institutionally (for example, through the
UNCITRAL Secretariat and various working groups) and through input
from external bodies, including the numerous IGOs and NGOs that
participate in the UNCITRAL process. 54 The need for technical
expertise is particularly high in fields such as private international
dispute resolution, which require an extensive understanding not only of
the relevant underlying law but also a detailed appreciation of how
various national and international laws interact as a comparative and
international matter. 55
Epistemic communities provide critical assistance to international
policymakers by “articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of
complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the
issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying

Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program, 46 INT’L ORG.
367, 371 (1992) (defining “the role played by epistemic communities as one of policy
coordination,” which is subsequently defined as “consent and mutual expectation”).
52. Haas, supra note 15, at 4. Epistemic communities provide policymakers with useful
“depictions of social or physical processes, their interrelation with other processes, and the likely
consequences of actions that require application of considerable scientific or technical expertise.”
Id. (noting the information “is the product of human interpretations of social and physical
phenomena”).
53. For example, UNCITRAL’s aim is to increase predictability in international commercial
relations while also maximizing cost-efficiency in international commercial transactions and
facilitating international trade. See G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
U.N. Doc. A/6594, at pmbl (Dec. 17, 1966) (establishing UNCITRAL); A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL:
BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 1 (2013)
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf
[hereinafter UNCITRAL GUIDE].
54. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 6-9; Haas, supra note 15, at 10 (describing the
United Nations as requiring a high degree of technical expertise); see also id. at 32 (noting “the
coordinating role of members of international secretariats and of governmental and nongovernmental bodies and the channels through which they interact”); C. Cora True-Frost, The
Security Council and Norm Consumption, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 115, 142-43 (2007)
(noting epistemic communities have affected significant change in policy and practice at the United
Nations, often through NGOs).
55. This is a field that even judges have difficulty understanding. See S.I. STRONG,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 1-24 (2012) (involving a
judicial guide published by the Federal Judicial Center, the research and education arm of the U.S.
federal judiciary, that is meant to provide assistance to U.S. judges in this area of law).
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salient points for negotiation.” 56 However, epistemic communities do
more than simply help create and coordinate international policy; 57 they
also participate in the juris-generative process, which would include
initiatives to adopt international treaties such as the proposed convention
on enforcement of mediated settlement agreements. 58
Epistemic communities are often at their best when they are either
engaged in the direct identification of state interests for decision makers
or highlighting the relevant features of a particular issue so that
policymakers may determine whether they have an interest at stake. 59 As
one scholar has noted, “epistemic communities fix the terms of the
discourse and shape the way in which we look at international law.” 60
Once one state has successfully completed this process, that state may
influence the actions of other states, thereby multiplying the effect of the
epistemic community. 61
This process perfectly describes the process by which the idea for
the proposed convention on enforcement of mediated settlement
agreements arose and was developed by the U.S. Department of State.
The project began as a result of a suggestion made by a participant at a
February 2014 meeting of the U.S. State Department’s Advisory
Committee on Private International Law. 62 After considering the matter
56. Haas, supra note 15, at 2.
57. The consensual nature of UNCITRAL makes it one of the quintessential examples of
international policy coordination. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 6; Haas, supra note 15,
at 32. No votes are taken to determine the direction taken by UNCITRAL or any of its constituent
bodies. Instead, the chair of the meeting in question (i.e., the full Commission, which meets once a
year in June or July, or the various working groups, which meet twice a year) simply gauges the
mood of the room when determining whether to move forward and in what manner. See
UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 7.
58. See Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L.
301, 322 (2007) (discussing the work of Harold Hongju Koh and Robert Cover, among others);
Anne Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L.
283, 324 (2004) (“The procedures and substantive principles developed over the course of repeated
conflicts among the same or successive actors take on precedential weight, both through learning
processes and the pragmatic necessity of building on experience. As they become increasingly
refined, these procedures and principles are increasingly likely to be codified in informal and
increasingly formal ways.”). UNCITRAL and Working Group II have illustrated a keen desire to
reflect and incorporate both formal and informal norms relating to international commercial
mediation. See Working Group II Comparative Study, supra note 44.
59. See Haas, supra note 15, at 4; see also Bianchi, supra note 8, at 19 (“To fix the
boundaries of what international law is and to set the parameters for what is or is not an acceptable
argument is no less than making the law.”).
60. Bianchi, supra note 8, at 16.
61. See Haas, supra note 15, at 4; see also id. at 33 (noting “epistemic communities operating
through transnationally applied policy networks can prove influential in policy coordination”).
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE,
62. See
PRIVATE
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3452.htm; PUBLIC MEETING ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
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internally and consulting with additional experts and stakeholders, the
State Department shaped the idea into a form that State Department
lawyers believed would most likely meet with international approval.
The proposal was formally presented at the July 2014 meeting of
UNCITRAL, and deliberations regarding the proposal are now
underway in Working Group II, which focuses on matters involving
international commercial arbitration and conciliation. 63 Various
members of the arbitration and mediation communities have engaged in
the debate about a new international instrument in this area of law
through interactions with their government representatives and direct
participation as NGO observers at UNCITRAL. 64
Epistemic communities do more than influence the creation of new
policy initiatives. Instead, as the current deliberations at UNCITRAL
show, epistemic communities play an ongoing role in the debate about
the shape of various international policy programs. Expert perspectives
can enter the process in several ways. First, specialist knowledge may be
sought at the institutional level, as occurs when the UNCITRAL
Secretariat asks for the views of internal and external experts on various

CONCILIATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/229037.htm. The original
suggestion to the State Department was based on information found in a scholarly article written by
the current author. Compare Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11-39 with U.S. Proposal, supra note 1.
However, the proposition was consistent with work of other commentators that came out shortly
thereafter. See Boule, supra note 5, at 65; Li, supra note 5, at 20; Lo, supra note 5, at 135; Wolski,
supra note 5, at 110. Interestingly, this latter group of authors appear to work primarily in the area
of mediation rather than arbitration, which supports the notion that an epistemic community of
experts in international commercial mediation is on the rise. See Haas, supra note 15, at 4 (“The
members of a prevailing [epistemic] community become strong actors at the national and
transnational level as decision makers solicit their information and delegate responsibility to
them.”).
63. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1; see also supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text
(discussing UNCITRAL deliberations to date).
64. See, e.g., 81 Fed. Reg. 50,591-92 (2016) (containing notice of a public meeting of the
U.S. Department of State Advisory Committee on Private International Law (ACPIL) to discuss the
proposed treaty on international settlement agreements). A wide variety of IGOs and NGOs sit in on
UNCITRAL deliberations, including generalist organizations like the American Bar Association
(ABA), the American Society of International Law (ASIL), the European Union (EU), the
International Institute on Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR Institute) and the International
Law Association (ILA), and numerous international arbitration organizations, including the
American Arbitration Association/International Centre for Dispute Resolution (AAA/ICDR), the
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Council on Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), the
New York International Arbitration Center (NYIAC), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC),
and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), among others. Although many of the arbitral
institutions are tangentially involved in international commercial mediation, at the time of writing
only one NGO at UNCITRAL, the International Mediation Institute (IMI), focuses primarily on
mediation and conciliation.
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technical issues. 65 Second, epistemic communities may exert indirect
influence on the international debate, as occurs when states seek the
assistance of stakeholders and national experts in analyzing policy
proposals and counterproposals submitted by other states as part of the
“transgovernmental communication” process. 66 Third, state delegations
to UNCITRAL are often made up of subject matter specialists who are
drawn from other government agencies or from a cadre of wellconnected (i.e., elite) academics and private practitioners. 67
Recourse to expert advisors does not necessarily result in
straightforward results, since epistemic communities are not the holders
of absolute truths. 68 Instead, epistemic communities “bring with them
their interpretations of the knowledge, which are in turn based on their
causally informed vision of reality and their notions of validity.” 69 As a
result, the content of the advice given by any expert consultant varies
depending on that person’s perspective, training, and background. 70
Furthermore, different states react differently to information provided by
specialist advisors. 71 Therefore, reliance on epistemic communities does
not guarantee a conflict-free negotiation process. To the contrary,

65. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 7; see also supra note 54 and accompanying
text (discussing NGOs and the UNCITRAL Secretariat). The preliminary report from an empirical
study written by the author was also made available to delegates and was cited by the Secretariat
and various governments in their submissions. See Secretariat Note, supra note 2, at 6 n.16; Initial
States’ Comments, supra note 2, at 6 n.7; S.I. Strong, Use and Perception of International
Commercial Mediation and Conciliation: A Preliminary Report of Issues Relating to the Proposed
UNCITRAL Convention on International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526302. The preliminary report was also
discussed orally during the Working Group meeting. See UNCITRAL, WORKING GROUP II, SOUND
RECORDINGS
OF
MEETINGS,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html.
66. Cho & Kelly, supra note 7, at 503 (quoting ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE,
POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 25-26 (1977)); see also 81 Fed. Reg. 50, 591-92 (2016) (containing
notice of a public meeting ACPIL seeking stakeholder input on the proposed treaty on international
settlement agreements); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6
EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 513 (1995) (discussing transgovernmental communication in a combined
theory of international law and international relations).
67. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 8; Haas, supra note 15, at 13 (contemplating
this process in the abstract); see also id. at 35 (noting members of an epistemic community “may be
found among the respected experts whose names recur on delegation lists to intergovernmental
meetings or among those responsible for drafting background reports or briefing diplomats”).
68. See Haas, supra note 15, at 21; see also id. at 23 (“The primary concern is the political
influence that an epistemic community can have on collective policymaking, rather than the
correctness of the advice given. While epistemic communities provide consensual knowledge, they
do not necessarily generate truth.”).
69. See id. at 21.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 30.
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significant debates about the proper course of action can arise both
within and between different epistemic communities.
Applying this knowledge to the current deliberations at
UNCITRAL suggests a potentially significant divergence of opinion
regarding the need for and shape of a new instrument involving
international commercial mediation, based on the background of the
experts in question. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that most of
the debate about the substantive details of the proposed convention is
taking place in Working Group II. 72 Although that Working Group
ostensibly focuses on matters involving both arbitration and conciliation
(i.e., mediation), historically the group was dedicated to international
commercial arbitration, and most of the NGOs involved in Working
Group II specialize in arbitration, not mediation. 73 Furthermore, most of
the members of national delegations to Working Group II have
experience in arbitration rather than mediation, although the composition
of state delegations can change from meeting to meeting. 74
The high proportion of arbitration experts in Working Group II is
troubling because the arbitration community could use its influence to
derail the proposed convention if a sufficient number of arbitral experts
view that initiative as contrary to their principles or interests. For
example, the arbitration community may find the proposed convention
offensive to a belief that arbitration is the best, if not only, way to
resolve international commercial and investment disputes. 75
Alternatively, some specialists in arbitration could perceive the proposed
convention as a threat to their financial interests, since the convention is
intended to increase the viability of mediation as a means of resolving
cross-border business disputes. 76 If the world of international dispute
resolution is framed in distributive terms (i.e., as a zero-sum equation
where the increase of mediation decreases the incidence of arbitration),
specialists in arbitration could be wary of supporting a procedure that
72. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 46; see also UNCITRAL, WORKING GROUP II,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html.
73. For example, only one of the NGOs in attendance (IMI) specializes in mediation. The
other IGOs and NGOs focus primarily on arbitration. See supra note 64 (listing various IGOs and
NGOs).
74. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 8. At this point, there is little overlap between
experts in mediation, including international commercial mediation, and experts in public
international law.
75. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
76. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32 (noting that a new convention could put
mediation and arbitration on equal footing); see also Boule, supra note 5, at 65; Lo, supra note 5, at
135 (suggesting a new enforcement regime); Madoff, supra note 5, at 161-66 (noting the need for a
new treaty); Wolski, supra note 5, at 110 (supporting a new treaty).
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could detrimentally affect their livelihood.77
The arbitral community may also harbor some residual antipathy to
the proposed convention on mediation because the business
community’s recent interest in international commercial mediation is
often seen to be the result of parties’ growing dissatisfaction with
international arbitration. 78 For years, the international commercial actors
have bemoaned the increasing cost and delays of international
commercial and investment arbitration.79 While the arbitral community
has attempted to solve the problem through various initiatives intended
to reform the arbitral process from the inside, those efforts have not been
entirely successful, 80 and an increasing number of parties have expressed
a desire to exit the arbitral system 81 through mediation. 82
This sort of crisis is precisely the type of catalyst that can trigger a
quantum shift in international policy. 83 Indeed, “it often takes a crisis or
shock to overcome institutional inertia and habit and spur
[policymakers] to seek help from an epistemic community. In some
cases, information generated by an epistemic community may in fact
77. See infra notes 122, 127-29 and accompanying text.
78. See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration,” 17 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 61, 64-66 (2012) [hereinafter Nolan-Haley, New Arbitration].
79. See WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES: STUDIES
IN LAW AND PRACTICE 3-27 (2d. ed. 2012).
80. See id; Rivkin, supra note 14; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11; see also COLLEGE OF
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS, PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIOUS, COST-EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (Thomas J. Stipanowich et al. eds., 2010); ICC COMMISSION, REPORT ON
TECHNIQUES FOR CONTROLLING TIME AND COSTS IN ARBITRATION (2012).
81. The concept of exit has been frequently discussed in the context of litigation. See Owen
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087 (1984); Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling Significant
Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881, 885-86 (2004); Jay Tidmarsh, Exiting Litigation, 41 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 263, 267 (2010). However, the issue has also been raised in the context of international
investment arbitration, where states have exhibited a desire to exit the system by withdrawing from
or refusing to enter into bilateral investment treaties. See Karen Halverson Cross, Converging
Trends in Investment Treaty Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 151, 164, 220-24, 228
(2012); Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93 NEB. L.
REV. 313, 335-47 (2014); Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 603,
604-05 (2012). Some law and economics analyses have been conducted concerning the choice to
proceed in international commercial arbitration versus transnational litigation. See Peter B.
Rutledge, Convergence and Divergence in International Dispute Resolution, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL.
49, 50. However, no known theoretical analyses compare the choice to use mediation versus
arbitration, particularly in the international commercial sphere. But see Stipanowich & Lamare,
supra note 21, at 44-54 (conducting an empirical study including international commercial
mediation); Strong, Empirical, supra note 35 (conducting an empirical study focusing solely on
international commercial mediation).
82. See Nolan-Haley, New Arbitration, supra note 78, at 64-66.
83. See Haas, supra note 15, at 14 (noting “[d]ecision makers do not always recognize that
their understanding of complex issues and linkages is limited”); see also id. at 15-16 (discussing
how epistemic communities assist with the process of change).
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create a shock.” 84
When considering the possibility of change, it is important to
consider the relative sophistication of the field in question, since
technical experts are most influential in areas where policymakers have
relatively few preconceptions about the area in which regulation is
occurring. 85 This phenomenon may prove problematic with respect to
the current U.S. proposal, since UNCITRAL has addressed enforcement
of settlement agreements arising out of conciliation on a number of
previous occasions, leading some skeptics to suggest that the field is
already saturated. 86 As a result, the views of various experts may not be
as persuasive regarding the current debate as they might otherwise have
been.
84. Id. at 14.
85. See id. at 29.
86. See United Nations on International Trade Law Working Group on Arbitration, Report of
the Secretary General, Settlement of Commercial Disputes - Possible Uniform Rules on Certain
Issues Concerning Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Written Form for Arbitration Agreement,
Interim Measures of Protection, Conciliation, paras. 105-12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.110
(Sept. 22, 2002); United Nations General Assembly, Report of the thirty-fifth session of the
Commission, U.N. G.A.O.R. Fifty-seventh Sess., Supp. No. 17, paras. 119-26, 172, U.N. Doc.
A/57/17 (June 17-18, 2002); United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Draft Guide
to Enactment and Use of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation,
paras. 77-81, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/514 (May 27, 2002); United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work of its Thirty-fifth Session,
paras. 38-48, 133-39, 160-61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/506 (Dec. 21, 2001); United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law, Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial
Disputes – Draft Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL, paras. 66-17, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.116 (Oct. 21, 2001); United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes - Model Legislative
Provisions on International Commercial Conciliation, paras. 45-49, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.115 (Sept. 18, 2001); United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work of its Thirty-fourth Session, paras. 15359, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/487 (June 15, 2001); United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, Report of the Secretary General, Settlement of Commercial Disputes – Preparation of Uniform
Provisions on: Written Form for Arbitration Agreements, Interim Measures of Protection, and
Conciliation, at n.39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.113/Add.1 (Mar. 9, 2001); United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work
of its Thirty-second Session, paras. 38-40, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/468 (Apr. 10, 2000); United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the Secretary General, Settlement of
Commercial Disputes – Possible Uniform Rules on Certain Issues Concerning Settlement of
Commercial Disputes: Conciliation, Interim Measures of Protection, Written Form for Arbitration
Agreement, paras. 34-42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108 (Jan. 14, 2000); United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Notes by UNCITRAL Secretariat, Possible Future Work
in the Area of International Commercial Arbitration, paras. 16-18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/460 (Apr. 6,
1999). However, commentators have criticized UNCITRAL’s failure to address issues relating to
the international enforceability of an international settlement agreement in these earlier efforts. See
PIETER SANDERS, THE WORK OF UNCITRAL ON ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION 234 (2d ed.,
2004).
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Furthermore, recognizing that change is necessary does not always
mean that experts agree on how such change should occur. Therefore,
the following section discusses how negotiation theory can both describe
and diminish the struggle between the various epistemic communities
involved in the current UNCITRAL treaty process.
B.

Epistemic Communities and Negotiation Theory

Conflicts between different epistemic communities (or different
factions of the same epistemic community) can be difficult for
policymakers who are seeking expert guidance in a particular
policymaking endeavor. 87 However, conflict is not necessarily a bad
thing. Indeed, reliance on a single epistemic community can lead to
significant negative repercussions, including the failure to consider
potentially helpful interdisciplinary perspectives.88
Relatively few commentators have considered how epistemic
communities play into standard theories of bargaining. 89 Instead, most
analyses of international law and international relations focus on game
theory. 90 However, application of a negotiation-analytic perspective 91
can overcome problems associated with other theoretic models.92

87. See Berman, supra note 58, at 327 (discussing Robert Cover’s views regarding global
legal processes and “the inevitable conflicts of norms articulated by multiple communities”); see
also Bianchi, supra note 8, at 17 (discussing different analytical approaches adopted by
international arbitrators, as considered further in Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and
Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013)); Kali Murray &
Ellen van Zimmeren, Dynamic Patent Governance in Europe and the United States: The Myriad
Example, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 299, 308-13 (2011) (discussing such conflicts in
patent law); Frédéric G. Sourgens, Law’s Laboratory: Developing International Law on Investment
Protection As Common Law, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 181, 205 (2014) (noting discrepancies in
international investment community); S.I. Strong, The Future of Trust Arbitration: Quo Vadis? in
ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW paras. 22.0922.23 (S.I. Strong ed., 2016) (discussing such conflicts in internal trust arbitration).
88. See Bianchi, supra note 8, at 17-18 (discussing how successful integration of different
epistemic groups can shape the formation of international law); Haas, supra note 15, at 24.
89. See Sebenius, supra note 9, at 326.
90. See Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167,
184 (1999) (“As suggested by Robert Putnam, the structure of international negotiations is a twolevel game simultaneously played by government representatives at the international level with the
representatives of the foreign governments and at the domestic level with representatives of
domestic interest groups.”).
91. See Sebenius, supra note 9, at 325, 351. Negotiation theorists differ from game theorists
in that the former “typically assume intelligent, goal-seeking action by the other players but not full
strategic rationality.” Id. at 350 (noting game theorists “assume that players are fully rational and
analyze their actions by equilibrium methods that calculate what each should optimally do given the
others’ optimal choices”).
92. For example, negotiation theory can provide a response to “suboptimal ‘cooperation’ in
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Furthermore, reliance on the concept of epistemic communities can be
useful not only in overcoming “‘strategic misrepresentation’ of interests
and beliefs” that can result in agreements that “fall far short of the Pareto
frontier,” 93 but also in describing how learning can occur among the
state parties during the negotiation process. 94
Obviously, an epistemic community’s ability to influence policy
change increases in direct proportion to the cohesiveness of the group
and its access to the relevant policymakers. 95 However, epistemic
communities that are involved in the international negotiation process
can also be said to
constitute a de facto natural coalition seeking to build a “winning coalition” of support behind its preferred policy choice. . . . Not only must
the epistemic coalition convince a sufficient number of actors to join
by various means of inducement, but it must also overcome actual and
potential “blocking coalitions” by a variety of standard direct and indirect approaches, including prevention, persuasion, conversion, dividing
and conquering, isolating and overwhelming, and simply outmaneuvering and outflanking opponents. 96

This characterization of the role of epistemic communities in the
international policymaking process is critical to a proper understanding
of the ongoing deliberations at UNCITRAL because the international
dispute resolution community can no longer be described as a single,
unitary entity. Furthermore, this view of epistemic communities
highlights the need to consider whether and to what extent the arbitral
and mediation communities will cooperate during the UNCITRAL
deliberations on the proposed treaty on mediated settlements.
the presence of distributional conflict,” termed “cooperation below the Pareto frontier,” which is “a
general phenomenon and [which] tends to occur when the cooperative potential of a situation is not
realized because of technical or strategic uncertainty, a lack of creativity, blocked communication,
or other factors.” Id. at 327.
93. Id. at 331 (noting that although agreements may arise in some contexts, “the adversarial
nature of the process may make potentially valuable learning and joint problem-solving effectively
impossible”).
94. See id. at 327, 329.
95. See id. at 361-62 (noting also that “[t]o the extent that a community falls short of these
conditions, policy entrepreneurs may take steps to foster its growth and potential influence”).
96. Id. at 352. Epistemic coalitions based on shared beliefs are “less familiar” than coalitions
based on “shared material interest, common histories or relationships, identical ideologies, common
enemies and the like” but may nevertheless be quite “potent.” Id. at 355. It is critically important to
understand the effect of coalition-building behavior in multiparty negotiations, such as those that
exist at UNCITRAL. Lawrence E. Susskind & Larry Crump, Editors’ Introduction—Multiparty
Negotiation: An Emerging Field of Study and New Specialization, in 1 MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATION:
COMPLEX LITIGATION AND LEGAL TRANSACTIONS xxv, xxv (Lawrence E. Susskind & Larry Crump
eds., 2008).
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Other aspects of the UNCITRAL process also validate this theoretic
model. For example, one premise suggests that members of epistemic
communities work indirectly, since they tend not to negotiate directly
with colleagues in other countries. 97 This phenomenon is certainly
apparent in the ongoing UNCITRAL process, where specialists in
arbitration and mediation are not meeting directly to resolve their
differences regarding the proposed convention but instead to pass their
positions on to state and NGO delegates, who present the arguments on
the floor of the United Nations.
However, there are some ways in which the UNCITRAL process
defies standard expectations. For example, some theorists have
suggested that epistemic communities seldom act as “an overt, crosscutting bloc that self-consciously coordinates tactics and strategy.” 98
However, a significant amount of strategic coordination appears to be
going on among various NGOs interested in the proposed UNCITRAL
convention. 99
One of the key functions of having epistemic communities involved
in international policymaking involves the experts’ ability to help
negotiators identify shared interests that will then lead to agreement on
various substantive issues. 100 However, epistemic communities also play
a critical role in ensuring the success of the final outcome by helping
parties see the benefits of continuing to cooperate in the implementation
of a particular agreement. 101
97. See Sebenius, supra note 9, at 352.
98. Id. at 353.
99. For example, IMI has been extremely active in supporting the UNCITRAL process
through various empirical studies and lobbying efforts. See, e.g., IMI, How Users View the Proposal
for a UN Convention on the Enforcement of Mediated Settlements (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://imimediation.org/uncitral-survey-results-news-item; IMI, Survey – UN Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements (Oct. 16, 2014),
https://imimediation.org/invitation-to-participate-in-survey-for-uncitral. The notion that epistemic
communities do not act strategically may be the result of the assumption that lawyers cannot form
epistemic communities. See supra note 23. However, it is not surprising that an epistemic
community made up completely or primarily of lawyers would be capable of operating in a strategic
manner.
100. See Haas, supra note 15, at 20; Sebenius, supra note 9, at 354-55 (“[E]pistemic
communities may frame issues for collective debate, propose specific policies, and identify salient
dimensions for negotiations, while excluding others.”).
101. See Sebenius, supra note 9, at 354. Thus, it has been said that an
epistemic coalition shares a common policy project, which can be interpreted as a proposed agreement. Over time, learning alters the zone of possible agreement, such that the
community’s preferred policy is widely seen to embody a greater degree of joint gains
and the alternatives to agreement are seen as less desirable. Thus, the conflict of interest . . . inherent in previous perceptions of the zone of possible agreement is reduced, and
cooperation becomes not only more likely to be achieved but also more likely to persist
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Cooperative efforts within and between the members of various
epistemic communities is of course ideal. However, expert groups do not
always behave in a supportive manner. Instead, as mentioned previously,
some epistemic communities involved in international lawmaking
operate as a type of blocking coalition. 102 This is a significant concern
for those involved in the proposed UNCITRAL convention, since it is
possible that some members of either the arbitration or mediation
communities might seek to thwart the forward movement of the U.S.
proposal. 103 The risk of a successful blocking effort rises to the extent
that a particular group is well-mobilized and well-situated to influence
state delegates. 104
The tension between cooperative and oppositional efforts may be
exacerbated or reduced depending on how the particular debate is
framed. For example, some epistemic communities may assert a more
distributive approach (sometimes referred to as “value-claiming”) while
others may adopt more of an integrative approach (sometimes referred to
as “value-creating”). 105 Applying these negotiation-oriented principles to
the current deliberations at UNCITRAL yield some very interesting
results, as the following section shows.
IV. EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND THE
UNCITRAL PROCESS
Although the interests of the international arbitration community
may seem to diverge from those of the mediation community, the split is
not necessarily fatal to the UNCITRAL process. International
policymakers routinely “negotiate with and among multiple epistemic
communities” and “enroll their various audiences and allies,
emphasizing particular aspects of their plans to members of diverse
epistemic communities.” 106 Nevertheless, actual or perceived conflicts
between the values and interests of the international arbitration and
mediation communities may create difficulties,107 since “the greater the
once achieved.
Id.
102. See id. at 359; see also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 121-22, 152-54 and accompanying text.
104. Sebenius, supra note 9, at 360 (quoting Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas); see also id. at
359 (noting shortfalls of other theories).
105. Id. at 360.
106. Jessica O’Reilly, Tectonic History and Gondwanan Geopolitics in the Larsemann Hills,
Antarctica, 34 POL’Y & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 214, 217 (2011).
107. Part of the problem arises from the fact that epistemic communities are meant to provide
expert technical advice to international policymakers, and very little hard data exists regarding the
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homogeneity in values, perspectives, and sense of mission, the less
conflict of interest there will be and the easier it will be for organizations
to reach and sustain agreements on appropriate actions.” 108
The longstanding, politically powerful, and highly cohesive nature
of the international arbitration community suggests that it will be able to
wield more influence in the UNCITRAL negotiations than the
international mediation community. This is particularly due to the
relatively high degree of access that arbitral elites have historically had
in the international policymaking process at UNCITRAL. 109 However,
the persuasiveness of any epistemic community often depends on
whether and to what extent the underlying beliefs of that community
demonstrate a need for international policy coordination. 110 Recently
generated empirical research suggests the international legal community
(broadly defined) perceives a significant need for a new treaty on the
international enforcement of mediated settlement agreements, 111 which
may bode well for the mediation community’s ability to overcome some
of the arbitral community’s concerns about the proposed convention. If
the mediation community can provide experts in arbitration with a
sufficiently compelling account of the need for and benefits of a new
treaty in this area of law, the two groups’ combined opinion will be
difficult for state actors to resist. 112
use, perception, or form of international commercial mediation. See Haas, supra note 15, at 4;
Strong, Empirical, supra note 35. Although the UNCITRAL Secretariat (which can itself be
considered an epistemic community) has compiled a number of comparative doctrinal studies
regarding the use of mediation in different jurisdictions, that study addresses a slightly different
issue. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 7-9; Working Group II Comparative Study, supra
note 44.
108. Sebenius, supra note 9, at 362.
109. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
110. Haas, supra note 15, at 30.
111. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35 (discussing results from an international study of
over 220 academics, judges, neutrals, practitioners, and parties involved in international dispute
resolution).
112. Although a unity of interests and goals is helpful, it does not always guarantee a
particular outcome in the international arena. For example, experts have suggested that
[b]inding norms typically emerge when a regime has moved along the continuum from
mere coordination to at least a partial convergence of interests and values. For example,
the processes of international negotiation leading to the conclusion of treaties are “often
characterized by bargaining and coercive moves rather than by persuasion and by appeals to common standards, shared values, and accepted solutions.” Treaty rules that result from such trade-offs, where common interests and values have not been present, are
unlikely to act as “causes” of behavior.
Brunee & Toope, supra note 6, at 31 (citations omitted). But see Carlos Fernando Diaz, With Law
on Their Minds: Some Reflections on the Nature of Public International Law at the Light of Current
Political Science Theory, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1133, 1143 (1998) (discussing permanent and
temporary coalitions based on “common values, interests and knowledge”).
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Negotiation theory suggests that, when framing this discussion, the
mediation community should focus on advancing proposals that
maximize areas of convergence between the arbitration and mediation
communities rather than areas of divergence.113 The following analysis
therefore seeks to identify the values and interests of the arbitral and
mediation communities so as to determine whether and to what extent
any commonalities exist. 114
In the course of this inquiry, the term “value” will be used to refer
to the relevant community’s view about how international commercial
disputes should be resolved, while the term “interest” will be used to
refer to the relevant community’s views about whether and how to foster
use of a particular process (in this case, international commercial
mediation and conciliation). 115 Thus, in this context, values are intrinsic

113. There is a considerable amount of literature on negotiation theory, although much of it
arises in the context of interpersonal relationships rather than intergroup or international relations.
But see Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 503, 510 (2008) (noting some scholars’ attempts to “transpose theories of private
bargaining into a social theory of problem solving” (citation and emphasis omitted)); see also id. at
505 (noting “negotiation literature presents . . . a well-developed body of ideas about the
microworkings of individual and group bargainers who are always imagined to be in interdependent
yet voluntary relations with fellow bargainers”). However, negotiation theory has been applied in
the interstate context. See Christian Downie, Toward an Understanding of State Behavior in
Prolonged International Negotiations, 17 INT’L NEGOT. 295, 299 (2012) [hereinafter Downie,
Prolonged Negotiations] (noting most theorists focus on one-off negotiations and noting the ways in
which long-term negotiations evolve); Anna Spain, Using International Dispute Resolution to
Address the Compliance Question in International Law, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 807, 820-22 (2009)
[hereinafter Spain, International Dispute Resolution].
114. This methodology is consistent with “interest-based” (i.e., integrative) negotiation. See
Sebenius, supra note 9, at 360. Experts have noted that
[a]n interest-based approach—sometimes called a “problem-solving” approach—
involves identification and selection of options maximizing the interests of all the parties. People begin by identifying interests and developing options for mutual gain and
then select the best option. contrasts with a traditional, positional—or adversarial—
approach, in which each side sets extreme aspiration levels and makes a series of strategic offers and counter-offers intended to result in a resolution as close as possible to that
side’s initial aspiration. Typically, each side makes small concessions to maximize its
adversarial advantage. An interest-based approach relies more on reason than threat and
has the potential to “create value” by identifying and satisfying the interests of all the
parties.
John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes, 22
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619, 628 n.29 (2007) (citing, inter alia, FISHER ET AL., supra note 49,
at 4-7, 40-84 and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 794-829 (1984)).
115. Although negotiation theorists recognize that parties can and often should negotiate with
an eye on both values and interests, there does not seem to be a universal definition of the terms. See
CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING
CONFLICTS 64-65 (2003) (discussing types of conflicts).
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in nature while interests reflect more of an instrumental character.116 The
distinction is important because value conflicts are typically more
difficult to resolve than interest conflicts in situations involving “regime
formation.” 117
A.

Core Values and Interests of the International Commercial
Arbitration Community

The maturity of international commercial arbitration makes it
relatively easy to determine the values and interests of this particular
group. 118 The primary interest of the international arbitration community
is clear: the continued predominance of international commercial and
investment arbitration as the preferred means of resolving cross-border
business disputes. 119 Although cynics may perceive this interest as
purely personal (claiming, for example, that expert arbitrators and
practitioners promote arbitration so as to increase the demand for their
skills and thus maximize their own personal gain), many members of the
community also support international arbitration as a matter of principle.
Indeed, a number of highly regarded specialists in international
commercial arbitration have taken the view that arbitration is the best
practical method of resolving cross-border business disputes, and that
international commercial arbitration promotes world peace, a view that
is consistent with the espoused purpose and principles of
UNCITRAL. 120
Although this type of principled approach is consistent with the
notion of an epistemic community, the intensity and nature of this
particular attitude may make it difficult for these sorts of “true believers”
to accept the possibility that mediation may be a better means of
resolving some types of disputes. 121 Indeed, persons who have adopted
116. See DAVID S. HAMES, CLOSING DEALS, SETTLING DISPUTES, AND MAKING TEAM
DECISIONS 91 (2012) (distinguishing intrinsic and instrumental goals in negotiation theory and
practice).
117. Young, supra note 6, at 10 (noting differences between spontaneous regime formation,
imposed regime formation and negotiated regime formation); see also MOORE, supra note 115, at
64-65 (discussing types of conflicts).
118. See S.I. Strong, Arbitration of International Business Disputes – Studies in Law and
Practice, by William W. Park, 29 ARB. INT’L 671, 672-74 (2013) (book review).
119. See BORN, supra note 31, at 73.
120. See G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6594, at
pmbl (Dec. 17, 1966); UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at Annex I; Jennifer Kirby, What is an
Award, Anyway?, 31 J. INT’L ARB. 475, 475 (2014) (noting that one highly renowned international
arbitration practitioner was firmly of the belief that international commercial arbitration was “the
key to world peace”); see also supra note 53.
121. The debate about whether and to what extent mediation is appropriate in cases involving
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this perspective may actively oppose the adoption of a new convention
relating to international commercial mediation based on a belief that
such an instrument is either unnecessary (because of arbitration’s
dominant status in the area of international dispute resolution) or
inefficient (because arbitration is the superior method of dispute
resolution and measures that increase the use of mediation simply
increase the cost and duration of the dispute resolution process as a
whole). 122
However, this is not the only way for arbitration specialists to frame
their interests. Instead, experts in international commercial arbitration
could view the issue more broadly and characterize their interests as
being consistent with those of their clients. Thus, if clients prefer to
mediate some or all of their disputes, 123 any measure that facilitates
international commercial mediation, including the proposed UNCITRAL
convention, can be seen as a good and necessary measure.124
At this point, it is unclear what it will take to convince parties or
practitioners of the benefits of mediation in the international commercial
or investment setting. 125 However, recent empirical studies have shown
that numerous experts in international dispute resolution believe that a
treaty on international commercial mediation that operates in a manner
similar to that of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) would
be very useful in increasing the attractiveness and use of mediation in
the cross-border business context. 126 This type of empirical support may
cross-border business disputes is ongoing. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 16-24. However, most
experts in mediation agree that mediation is not appropriate for all types of disputes. See John Lande
& Rachel Wohl, Listening to Experienced Users, 13 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 18, 19 (2007); Frank E.A.
Sander & Lukasz Rozdieczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed
Analysis Leading to A Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006).
122. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32 (discussing how a convention would help put
international commercial arbitration and international commercial mediation on a more even
footing).
123. Mediation specialists have identified a number of benefits associated with mediation as a
general proposition, although it is unclear whether and to what extent those benefits apply in crossborder commercial cases. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35.
124. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32 (discussing perceived need for convention to
promote international commercial mediation).
125. Empirical evidence suggests that the major reason why parties and practitioners do not
recommend mediation in cross-border business disputes is a lack of evidence about the benefits of
the process. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35, at 36.
126. See New York Convention, supra note 45; Strong, Empirical, supra note 35 (discussing
data regarding the content of future conventions in this field). The New York Convention is widely
considered the most successful commercial treaty in the world and provides for the recognition and
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards. See New York Convention, supra note 45;
BORN, supra note 31, at 78, 99.
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be very useful in convincing the arbitral community of the need for
mediation in a properly designed international dispute resolution
system. 127
The international arbitration community’s values can also be
described in both broad and narrow terms. For example, if the question
is considered from a distributive perspective (i.e., as a zero-sum
proposition that pits arbitration against mediation), any increase in the
use of mediation must necessarily result in an equal decrease in the use
of arbitration. 128 If the debate is framed in these terms, the arbitral
community will of course choose to promote arbitration over mediation
and will consequently oppose the proposed convention. This type of
blocking behavior could have a significant effect on deliberations at
UNCITRAL, given the influence of the arbitral community in
UNCITRAL and Working Group II. 129
At one time, distributive analyses were considered the primary, if
not exclusive, means of analyzing interstate negotiations. 130 However,
contemporary theorists have come to recognize the value of integrative
methodologies wherein parties seek to “create” value rather than simply
“claim” value. 131 Framing the UNCITRAL process in integrative (i.e.,
win-win) terms would require negotiators to consider whether various
values could be redefined in a way that would promote various areas of
commonality.
That process would require parties to move past superficial
analyses and focus on the core values of international commercial
arbitration, which are typically considered to include privacy,
confidentiality, finality, and an impartial and independent third-party
neutral. 132 International arbitration also respects procedural fairness and
127. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Reflections on Designing Governance to Produce the Rule
of Law, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 74 (“A conflict, issue, dispute, or case submitted to any institution
for managing conflict (including one labeled ADR) exists in the context of a system of rules,
processes, steps, and forums. In the field of ADR, this is called dispute systems design (DSD).”). It
is possible, if not critically important, to consider dispute system design on an international scale.
See Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute
Resolution, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 46-47 (2010) [hereinafter Spain, Integration].
128. See Sebenius, supra note 9, at 335 (discussing the difference between “claiming value”
(as in win-lose or distributive scenarios) and “creating value” (as in win-win or integrative
scenarios)).
129. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
130. See William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 367, 375 (1999) (citing survey indicating that positional (i.e., distributive) bargaining was
used entirely or primarily in seventy-one percent of cases).
131. See id. (noting that lawyers wanted to use interest-based negotiation more); Sebenius,
supra note 9, at 360.
132. See BORN, supra note 31, at 73-97; Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 21, at 36-38;
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party autonomy as well as the ability to combine common law and civil
law procedures, avoid the parochialism of national courts, and obtain an
easy, predictable, and relatively inexpensive means of enforcing arbitral
awards across borders. 133 At one time, international arbitration was
considered a faster and less expensive alternative to international
litigation, although these attributes have recently been questioned as a
result of the increasing legalism in the field. 134
Interestingly, almost all of these values can be met in mediation to
virtually the same extent as in arbitration. Mediation is a private and
confidential process featuring an impartial, third party-neutral who
upholds procedural fairness and party autonomy and who assists the
parties in resolving international commercial and investment disputes
efficiently and cost-effectively without the need to involve the judicial
system. 135 These shared attributes exist even though mediation is a
consensual mechanism rather than an adjudicative one. 136 The only
values that are not currently met in mediation are (1) the desire to obtain
a final and binding award, since mediation is considered non-binding
unless and until the parties sign a settlement agreement, and (2) the
ability to achieve easy, predictable, and relatively inexpensive
enforcement of the result of the process (an award in arbitration and a
settlement agreement in mediation, if the parties decide to resolve the
dispute) across national borders. 137 However, the proposed UNCITRAL
convention promotes both of these two values by establishing an
efficient and cost-effective means of enforcing a settlement agreement
arising out of international commercial mediation, thereby helping
QUEEN MARY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, RESEARCH AT THE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter QMUL Studies] (containing details regarding five different empirical studies
concerning international arbitration); see also EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 13-66 (2010) (discussing theoretical bases of international
arbitration).
133. See BORN, supra note 31, at 73-97.
134. See id. at 86-87.
135. See Michael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of Definition, 10 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 69, 78-83 (2005) (noting problems inherent in defining mediation).
136. Although arbitration also arises by consent of the parties, the parties are bound to the
procedure and to a final, binding resolution of the matter once they consent to the process, which is
adjudicative in nature. Mediation, on the other hand, is considered consensual not only because the
parties must express their consent to enter into the mediation process but because resolution of the
dispute only occurs if the parties agree (i.e., consent) to a particular settlement agreement.
Mediators do not impose a particular outcome on the parties, as is the case in arbitration.
137. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32 (noting lack of enforcement mechanism in
international commercial mediation); Strong, Empirical, supra note 35, at 47 (noting difficulty in
international enforcement of mediated settlements).
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parties achieve final and binding resolution of their dispute. 138
If the issue is framed in this manner, the international arbitration
community not only can but also should support the proposed
convention as a means of furthering the core values of their epistemic
community. While some individuals may continue to oppose the
proposed convention based on personal financial concerns, membership
in an epistemic community requires the adoption of certain “shared
normative commitments” not as a result of external motivations (which
would include financial self-interest) but instead as a result of a
“principled approach to the issue at hand.” 139 As a result, the most
influential voices in the arbitral community will likely focus on and
promote these core, universal values rather than personal
considerations. 140
B.

Core Values and Interests of the (International Commercial)
Mediation Community

The relatively recent rise of international commercial mediation as
a field of practice and inquiry can make it somewhat difficult to identify
the community’s core values and interests.141 Indeed, discussions at
UNCITRAL have raised fears that a community of experts in
international commercial mediation may not yet exist, since a number of
participants in the process have been drawn from the domestic sphere

138. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1. At this point, it is very difficult to enforce a mediated
settlement agreement across national borders. See id.; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32 (noting
difficult of enforcement of agreements in international commercial mediation).
139. Haas, supra note 15, at 19; see also Sebenius, supra note 9, at 325 (claiming that “an
epistemic community can be understood as a special kind of de facto natural coalition of ‘believers’
whose main interest lies not in the material sphere but instead in fostering the adoption of the
community’s policy project”); id. at 353 (distinguishing material interests from policy goals).
140. See Bianchi, supra note 8, at 17-18 (noting a “plurality of visions quite obviously entails
a struggle between different social groups that attempt to impose their own view as the most
authoritative and legitimate one. To determine who is entitled to speak authoritatively about
international law is certainly a stake that most members of the different epistemic communities at
play in international law would consider as worth fighting for”); Haas, supra note 15, at 17-18;
Sebenius, supra note 9, at 325. Every epistemic community considers certain beliefs and practices
as reflective of the received or conventional wisdom that distinguishes core members of the
community from those on the fringe. See Haas, supra note 15, at 17-18 (noting that membership and
influence in an epistemic community are determined not only by a person’s “professional pedigree”
but also by reference to various “validity tests”).
141. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text. Commentators have disputed whether a
singular theory of mediation exists even within the United States. See Dorothy J. Della Noce et al.,
Clarifying the Theoretical Underpinnings of Mediation: Implications for Practice and Policy, 3
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 39, 40-41 (2002).
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rather than the international realm. 142 This phenomenon is potentially
problematic given the often significant differences between international
and domestic disputes. 143
The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the domestic
mediation community includes a number of practitioners and neutrals
who work frequently in fields other than commercial law.144 Thus,
during the early days of the development of the U.S. proposal, some
observers suggested that the proposed convention should incorporate
various mechanisms (such as a “cooling off” period between the time of
the settlement agreement and the signing of a binding document) that
might be useful in certain types of domestic disputes but that are neither
necessary nor appropriate in the international commercial context.145
This is not to say that it is impossible to identify the values and
interests of the international commercial mediation community. For
example, it may be possible to extrapolate some observations from the
domestic realm and apply them to cross-border matters, although that
approach must be used with caution. 146 Some assistance may also be
gleaned from a number of recent empirical studies on the use and
perception of international commercial mediation and conciliation. 147
Together, these resources provide some insights that may prove useful to
the UNCITRAL deliberations.
In many ways, the interests of the mediation community can be said
to mirror those of the arbitration community, in that experts in mediation
would like to see their preferred procedure—mediation—established as
the prevalent means of resolving cross-border business disputes, thereby
returning mediation and conciliation to the prominence they enjoyed
142. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35.
143. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 16-24.
144. Thus, for example, family law mediators face very different dilemmas and use somewhat
different procedures than commercial mediators. See John Bickerman, We Have Met the Enemy . . .
And He May Be Us, 13 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 2, 2 (2007).
145. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 90-92 (2001).
Although cooling off periods may be appropriate in family or consumer mediation, where there is a
significant power imbalance, such mechanisms are not usually necessary in international
commercial of investment matters, where the parties are represented by experienced counsel and
operate at arm’s length, particularly since mandatory cooling off periods could have significant
financial ramifications in situations where interest on loans or defaults accrues daily. See Mark
Kantor, Negotiated Settlement of Public Infrastructure Disputes, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: IN MEMORIAM THOMAS WÄLDE 199, 214 (Todd Weiler & Freya
Baetens eds., 2011) (noting the cost of mandatory “cooling off” or negotiation periods can be
astronomical).
146. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 16-24.
147. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35; IMI SURVEY, supra note 99.
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prior to World War II. 148 While cynics might claim that this position is
based on self-interest, since an increase in a procedure would lead to an
increase in revenue for mediation experts, that allegation appears
inaccurate in the face of the mediation community’s strongly held belief
in the superiority of mediation over other types of dispute resolution. 149
Furthermore, the incidence of international commercial mediation is at
this point so small that it would appear unlikely that participants in the
UNCITRAL process would support the proposed convention simply as a
means of increasing their own personal income. 150
Although the mediation community could frame its interests as only
involving the promotion of mediation per se, it is also possible to
characterize the community’s interests as paralleling those of their
clients. Since an increasing number of commercial actors have indicated
that they would like to pursue mediation and conciliation of their crossborder business and investment disputes, 151 the international mediation
community can also promote mediation as a means of fulfilling their
client’s interests.
These two analyses mirror those used to determine the interests of
the international arbitration community. However, early discussions
regarding the proposed UNCITRAL process brought another potential
interest to light: the mediation community’s interest in having the
proposed convention reflect the “right” or “best” procedure. This interest
was evident in comments from a number of mediation specialists that the
relatively undeveloped nature of international commercial mediation
meant that it was too soon to consider an international convention of the
type proposed by the United States. 152 However, this position was in
many ways factually and legally unfounded. For example, there are
already numerous types of international instruments relating to
international commercial mediation and conciliation, which suggests a
certain degree of legal sophistication even if parties have not yet availed
148. See Schwartz, supra note 45, at 99, 107.
149. See Hensler, supra note 34, at 83 (noting near-universal belief among mediation experts
that mediation is the best means of resolving disputes). This belief persists despite the absence (thus
far) of any hard empirical evidence of the benefits of mediation in the international commercial
context. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35.
150. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35, at 26 (noting that only nine percent of respondents
had participated in more than twenty international commercial mediations in the preceding three
years).
151. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11.
152. The underlying concern was that the “wrong” process might be embedded into law,
thereby freezing the development of international commercial mediation and injuring the field as a
whole. Other participants expressed worries about imposing increased formalism on a process that
they viewed as intended to be relatively informal.
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themselves of the existing procedures. 153 Furthermore, the adoption of a
convention on enforcement of mediated settlements does not require
consensus on the shape of the proceedings themselves, just as the New
York Convention does not require consensus on the shape of arbitral
proceedings. 154 Thus, issues involving the need to foster the “right” type
of mediation do not appear to be a sufficiently compelling reason to
block the proposed convention and can thus be set aside. 155
Interest identification is not the only task that must be completed. It
is also necessary to determine the values of the international commercial
mediation community. Unfortunately, several potential difficulties arise
in this regard.
The first issue involves problems associated with defining the
difference between mediation and conciliation. 156 Although UNCITRAL
has previously defined these two terms as being synonymous, 157
participants in the UNCITRAL process have suggested that a more
precise definition will be necessary in any future instrument in this
area. 158 It is unclear at this point whether that claim has been raised as an
obstructionist tactic or whether the concerns are legitimate, particularly

153. For example, UNCITRAL has enacted a model law concerning international commercial
mediation and conciliation as well as procedural rules. See United Nations General Assembly,
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 57/18, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/18, (Jan.
24, 2003); United Nations General Assembly, Conciliation Rules of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 81st plen. mtg. at 260, U.N. Doc.
A/35/52 (Dec. 4, 1980). Numerous private institutions have also adopted procedural rules relating to
international commercial mediation. See John M. Barkett, Avoiding the Costs of International
Commercial Arbitration: Is Mediation the Solution?, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010, 359, 365-82 (Arthur W. Rovine ed.,
2010).
154. See New York Convention, supra note 45. However, the proposed convention may
equalize some of the existing legal disparities between international commercial mediation and
international commercial arbitration (namely, those relating to enforcement of the outcome) and
could thereby drive parties toward mediation in the same way that the New York Convention drove
parties toward arbitration in the post-World War II era. See id.; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 13-14,
31-32.
155. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (regarding core and fringe beliefs).
156. The academic debate about this issue has been quite heated at times. See Nolan-Haley,
Primrose Path, supra note 36, at 1009-10; Spain, Integration, supra note 127, at 10-11; Nancy A.
Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation Into Bilateral
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 84-85 (2013).
157. See WG Report, supra note 2, para. 13 n.11; UNCITRAL MODEL LAW GUIDE, supra
note 2, at 11; U.S. Proposal, supra note 1, at 9 (suggesting that any future instrument adopted by
UNCITRAL in this field would likely need to include a definition of “conciliation”).
158. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1, at 4; United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-third
session (New York, 27 June-15 July, 2015), paras. 20-23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861 (Sept. 17, 2015).
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given that arbitration has long experienced similar definitional problems
without anyone claiming that the New York Convention is thereby
invalidated. 159
At this point, the major difference between mediation and
conciliation appears to be that conciliation requires an evaluative
element, whereas mediation merely permits a certain amount of
evaluation by the neutral. 160 Beyond that, the two processes appear to
reflect relatively similar values. As a result, this issue can be set aside.
A second concern arises as a result of the relative lack of theoretical
and empirical research into the special nature of international
commercial mediation and conciliation. 161 Although a significant
amount of information exists regarding the values of domestic
mediation, it is unclear whether and to what extent those principles can
be extended to the international commercial realm. 162 Nevertheless, a
heuristic analysis informed by the available data would suggest some
preliminary conclusions.
First, empirical research shows that actual and potential participants
in international commercial mediation value the process to the extent it
saves them time and money, a goal that is consistent with that of the
arbitral community. 163 Furthermore, survey data indicates that
commercial parties value the saving of time and money even over the
preservation of existing relationships, which is one of the benefits that
has long been theoretically linked to mediation. 164 However, if parties do
not really value mediation’s ability to maintain commercial
relationships, then the mediation community cannot be said to value that
attribute either, at least in a paradigm that ties the community’s interests
to client interests.

159. See S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? StoltNielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 242-43 (2012)
(discussing the problems inherent in defining arbitration).
160. See Nolan-Haley, Primrose Path, supra note 36, at 1009-10.
161. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 16-24; see also supra note 99 (discussing additional
empirical work in this field).
162. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 16-24. For example,
theorists have suggested that settlement is not considered a core interest of mediation. See Creo,
supra note 21, at 1032. However, empirical studies have suggested that parties to cross-border
business disputes are very interested in the efficacy of the procedure. See Strong, Empirical, supra
note 35.
163. See also supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
164. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35. During the course of the UNCITRAL deliberations,
at least one experienced neutral noted that most of her international commercial mediations
involved the break-up of commercial dealings and that the parties therefore had no need to preserve
ongoing relationships.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss3/4

34

Strong: Clash of Cultures

2016]

CLASH OF CULTURES

529

Theoretical analyses have suggested a number of other potential
values. For example, a number of experts have suggested that mediation
reflects an interest in “connection, voice, and choice” as well as
“recognition, empowerment, validation, acknowledgment, apology,
opportunity to be heard, facilitated dialogue, engagement with a nonpartisan mediator, balance, absence of formal procedures, exploration of
risk and consequences, and creation of alternative solutions outside those
available within the judicial system.” 165 However, empirical research
suggests that these issues are nowhere near as important to international
commercial actors as the saving of time and money. 166
Assuming that mediation is indeed a time- and cost-effective means
of resolving international commercial disputes, 167 then adopting a
convention facilitating the fast and easy enforcement of settlement
agreements arising out of mediation would appear to further that
interest. 168 Evidence suggests that existing methods of enforcing
settlement agreements across national borders are both timely and
expensive, 169 which may be one of the reasons why international
commercial mediation lost ground to international commercial
arbitration in the post-World War II era. 170 As a result, the proposed
convention would appear to meet the interests of the international
mediation community, which subsequently suggests that the mediation
community should therefore support the ongoing UNCITRAL process.
While some debate may arise as to what particular processes fall within
the scope of the convention and what measures should be used to

165. Creo, supra note 21, at 1032.
166. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35 (noting low ratings of a number of purported
interests in mediation in the international commercial context).
167. No widespread empirical data is yet available on this point. See id. However, anecdotal
evidence and case studies have identified some costs savings in the international commercial realm.
See Walter G. Gans & David Stryker, ADR: The Siemens’ Experience, 51 DISP. RESOL. J. 40, 41
(Apr.-Sept. 1996); Michael A. Wheeler & Gillian Morris, GE’s Early Dispute Resolution Initiative
(A), HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 2-4 (June 19, 2001) (discussing General Electric’s domestic
dispute resolution strategy, based on the Six Sigma approach); Michael A. Wheeler & Gillian
Morris, GE’s Early Dispute Resolution Initiative (B), HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL SUPPLEMENT
801-453 (June 2001) (discussing the internationalization of General Electric’s dispute resolution
strategy); F. Peter Phillips, Speeches Spreading the Word on Business ADR: Assessing Recent
Efforts . . . And Looking Forward, 25 ALT. HIGH COST LITIG. 3, 9 (2007) (discussing corporate
“poster boys” for commercial mediation).
168. See Boule, supra note 5, at 65; Li, supra note 5, at 13; Lo, supra note 5, at 135; Strong,
ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32; Wolski, supra note 5, at 110.
169. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1, at 4; Edna Sussman, The New York Convention Through
a Mediation Prism, 14 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 10, 10-13 (2009).
170. See Schwartz, supra note 45, at 99, 107; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 13-14.
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provide effective and fair enforcement across national borders, 171 the
propriety of the end goal appears clear.
V. CONCLUSION
As the preceding analysis shows, the international legal community
has become increasingly diversified in the last few years so as to reflect
and respond to the demands of an ever-more globalized world. The
international arbitration community has been particularly successful in
asserting its presence on the international stage and is now a
sophisticated and powerful influence in international policymaking
circles. However, the success of the arbitral regime has not insulated the
process from a number of criticisms. 172 Indeed, the field of international
commercial and investment arbitration is currently facing a number of
challenges, including claims that mediation and conciliation can be used
to overcome many of the perceived ills of international arbitration. 173
This Article has not focused on the substance of the debate
regarding the relative merits of arbitration and mediation in international
commercial and investment matters, although there is a great deal to
consider in that regard. Instead, the discussion here has focused on how
the clash of epistemic cultures is playing out in the international
lawmaking process, particularly with respect to the U.S. proposal for a
new UNCITRAL convention on international commercial mediation. 174
Many members of the arbitral community see the U.S. proposal as
an existential threat to the hegemony of international commercial and
investment arbitration. Indeed, the deliberations at UNCITRAL have not
only underscored the severity and significance of mediation’s challenge
to arbitration as the preferred means of resolving cross-border business
and investment disputes, they have also highlighted the schism between
the arbitration and mediation communities. However, debate does not
need to be divisive to be fruitful. Instead, it is possible for the
UNCITRAL process to bring the two groups together, not necessarily to
(re)unify the fields of international commercial arbitration and mediation
into a single epistemic community but to demonstrate the many
commonalities between the two factions.
One of the most valuable functions of an epistemic community is
171. That issue is very much up for debate in UNCITRAL, although it is beyond the scope of
the current Article. See Secretariat 2016 Note, supra note 4.
172. See PARK, supra note 79, at 3-27; Rivkin, supra note 14; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at
11.
173. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11.
174. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1.
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its ability to educate international policymakers about various interests,
goals, and procedures so as to promote the development of an
international policy that satisfies the needs of all participants in both the
short and long terms. 175 Though helpful, this attribute can be problematic
if an expert group relies on hard bargaining techniques to push through
an agenda that is largely if not entirely self-aggrandizing. In these
situations, the coalition with greater political power or influence in the
interstate lawmaking process—in this case, the international arbitration
community—might attempt to block reform efforts (such as the new
convention on international commercial mediation) that are seen as
harmful to the status quo. This type of tactic might be particularly
attractive to persons who frame negotiations as a zero-sum analysis, as is
typically the case of those who routinely engage in adjudicative
processes such as arbitration. 176
However, negotiation theory has shown that distributive models are
not the only option available to parties at UNCITRAL. Instead, state
delegates can, with the assistance of various epistemic communities,
frame various issues in integrative terms and thereby seek to develop an
international instrument that maximizes benefits to all participants rather
than advantaging one group to the detriment of the other. Indeed,
UNCITRAL, as a consensus-based organization, tends to support this
type of approach. 177 As a result, it may be in the best interests of both the
arbitration and the mediation communities to find a mutually agreeable
solution to the crisis in international commercial dispute resolution
rather than adopt a zero-sum, distributive perspective.
This approach may not be as difficult as it initially appears, since
this Article has shown that the arbitration and mediation communities
share a great deal of common ground, ranging from the desire to fulfill
their clients’ desires to the wish to promote certain core values such as
privacy, confidentiality, finality, procedural fairness, party autonomy,
and use of an impartial and independent third-party neutral to obtain an
easy, predictable, and relatively inexpensive means of resolving disputes

175. See Downie, Prolonged Negotiations, supra note 113, at 302-04; Sebenius, supra note 9,
at 327, 329. Epistemic communities can be useful not only in helping to finalize the terms of an
international agreement but in ensuring widespread adoption and adherence after the instrument has
been adopted. See id. at 354.
176. See Jack Coe, Planning for International Disputes (And What Makes Them Distinctive), 5
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 385, 393 (2005).
177. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 6; see also Adler & Haas, supra note 51, at
371 (defining “the role played by epistemic communities as one of policy coordination,” which is
subsequently defined as “consent and mutual expectation”); supra note 57.
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across national borders. 178 Even more importantly, both communities
support the quick and inexpensive resolution of international commercial
and investment disputes. 179 These shared beliefs and practices are quite
significant and suggest that the two expert groups can find common
ground if they are willing to move past the debate about whether
adjudicative or consensus-based techniques are preferred or preferable in
international commercial and investment disputes as an abstract concern.
In many ways, the debate about the relative merits of arbitration
and mediation reflect a value conflict that is inherently difficult, if not
impossible, to resolve. 180 While empirical research may eventually shed
light on this issue, there is currently no hard evidence supporting a
conclusion that one dispute resolution technique is inherently better than
the other, at least at a conceptual level. 181 Furthermore, the lack of
equality in the surrounding legal environments suggests that any
comparison between international arbitration and international mediation
that is based on current usage levels is inapt.182 As a result, it appears
best to conclude that, all things being equal, parties will prefer
arbitration in some circumstances and mediation in others, which
supports the development of an international instrument that puts the two
procedures on equal footing so that parties can choose the appropriate
dispute resolution technique free of any negative externalities.183 This
sort of incompletely theorized agreement or modus vivendi would appear
sufficient in the current context. 184
The combination of international relations theory and negotiation
theory also offers another interesting proposition for participants in the
current UNCITRAL process. Scholars have suggested that epistemic
communities typically assert only an indirect influence on the
development of international policy, in that experts advise state
representatives who then negotiate with other state actors. 185 As this
Article has shown, that approach seems to be in operation in the current
deliberations at UNCITRAL. 186 However, negotiation theory places a

178. See BORN, supra note 31, at 73-97.
179. See id.; Strong, Empirical, supra note 35, at 49.
180. See MOORE, supra note 115, at 64-65; Young, supra note 6, at 10.
181. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35.
182. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 13-14.
183. See Lande & Wohl, supra note 121, at 19; Sander & Rozdieczer, supra note 121, at 1-2;
Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 13-14, 31-32.
184. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,
1739, 1746-51 (1995).
185. See supra notes 65-67, 96 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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high value on direct communication between the actual parties in
conflict, 187 which suggests that the mediation community could make
significant inroads in the ongoing effort to promote the proposed
convention by engaging directly with the arbitral community, since the
two groups are in many ways the source of the current conflict. Indeed,
specialists in mediation are particularly well-placed to engage in these
types of discussions, given their technical expertise in interest-based
negotiation. If the mediation community can convince the arbitral
community of the benefits of the proposed treaty and the range of shared
interests in promoting a new international instrument in this field, the
arbitral community can then join (rather than oppose) efforts to convince
state delegates of the need to adopt a new convention on this subject. 188
Such a combined effort would likely have a strong influence on
various state delegates and thus could improve the chances that the
proposed initiative will succeed. However, different state delegates may
interpret and apply expert advice in different ways, 189 which means that
a united arbitration-mediation initiative does not guarantee a particular
outcome. Furthermore, this analysis has not taken into account the
possible influence of other coalitional forces. For example, the current
deliberations are experiencing a significant amount of resistance from
several states and geographic regions on grounds unrelated to the
distinctions between arbitration and mediation. Interestingly, a number
of the arguments appear to arise out of differences between the civil law
and common law. For example, some civil law countries have expressed
concerns that settlement agreements should be considered akin to any
other type of contract and should therefore not be considered in
connection with various rules of civil procedure. Conversely, many if
not most common law jurisdictions view mediation as a dispute
resolution mechanism that is on the same conceptual level as both
litigation and arbitration and therefore consider mediated settlements to
be in many ways analogous to arbitral awards and judicial decisions.
These disparities may be the result of various differences in common

187. See Spain, International Dispute Resolution, supra note 113, at 825-26.
188. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1; Downie, Prolonged Negotiations, supra note 113, at
312. Interestingly, various members of the mediation community attempted to engage in direct
communications with state delegates at the February 2016 meeting of Working Group II through a
meeting meant to educate state delegates about mediation. See Hal Abramson & Janet Martinez,
Workshop on Conciliation Process (Feb. 2016) (featuring a lunchtime program at Working Group II
organized by IMI). However, such efforts could backfire if the arbitral community views such
tactics as illegitimate.
189. See Haas, supra note 15, at 30.
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law and civil law reasoning, 190 or may reflect certain theoretical
differences on how to frame private forms of dispute resolution. 191
While these issues are beyond the scope of the current Article, they bear
further analysis in the future.
Another influence to consider involves groups of repeat or crosscutting international players. A number of NGO and state delegates are
involved in negotiations at several public and private international
institutions, including UNCITRAL, the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, and the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (UNIDOIT). These individuals are not only engaged in
projects that involve several different organizations, they are also active
in a variety of areas of substantive and procedural law. 192 Their
knowledge, expertise, and influence extends across a wide range of
projects, thereby adding another level of complexity to analyses
regarding interstate negotiations. While these issues are also beyond the
scope of the current Article, it would be interesting to study whether
these individuals can be considered to have created an epistemic
community of their own and whether these types of repeat players affect
international policymaking in a unique and discernable manner.
The analysis in this Article has focused primarily on matters
relating to the proposed UNCITRAL convention on international
commercial mediation and is therefore of significant importance to
members of the international dispute resolution community. However,
the discussion regarding the interplay between international relations and

190. See S.I. Strong, Reasoned Awards in International Commercial Arbitration: Embracing
and Exceeding the Common Law-Civil Law Dichotomy, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 36-39 (2015).
191. See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 71-82 (2003) (discussing the juridical nature of international arbitration and
distinguishing between four different theories, incluidng the jurisdictional theory, the contractual
theory, the mixed theory (sometimes called the hybrid theory) and the autonomous theory).
CONFERENCE
ON
PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
192. See
HAGUE
https://www.hcch.net/en/home (last visited Feb. 21, 2017) (listing projects in family law (including
child abduction, adoption, maintenance, and protection of adults and children); civil procedure
(including access to justice, apostilles, choice of courts, evidence, form of wills and service of
process); and substantive law (including choice of law in contracts, securities and trusts), among
others); UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/about-unidroit/work-programme (last visted Feb. 21,
2017) (listing projects involving international commercial contracts, secured transactions, capital
markets, satellite-based services and farming contracts, among others); WORKING GROUPS,
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups.html (last visted Feb.
21, 2017) (listing working groups in micro-small, and medium-sized enterprises; procurement;
privately financed infrastructure projects; arbitration and conciliation; international contract
practices; international sale of goods; transport law; shipping; electronic commerce; electronic data
interchange; international payments; international negotiable instruments; insolvency; and security
interests, among others).
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negotiation theory is also of interest to a wider audience. Not only does
the analysis reflected herein provide useful insights into the international
lawmaking process, it also demonstrates the difficulties experienced by
many newly formed epistemic communities who wish to “expand from a
typically small and de facto natural coalition into a meaningful winning
coalition.” 193 Epistemic communities may experience additional
difficulties in the coming years, given the increasing disregard for
technical expertise in political debate and discourse. 194 As a result,
experts in international law, international relations, and dispute
resolution can learn much by analyzing the current deliberations at
UNCITRAL concerning a new international treaty involving
international commercial mediation and conciliation.

193. Sebenius, supra note 9, at 364.
194. See S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting the Challenge, 165
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 137 (2017); S.I. Strong, Truth in a Post-Truth Society: How Sticky
Defaults, Status Quo Bias and the Sovereign Prerogative Influence the Perceived Legitimacy of
International Arbitration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
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